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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Consider Miles Davis stepping up to the microphone and sculpting a 
powerful musical statement—complete with furtive tonal secrets, inside 
jokes, and blasting climactic summits—all composed in real time over a 
hard- swinging rhythm section. Now consider a hip- hop freestyle rapper 
performing an unrehearsed verse, and each word takes him dangerously 
closer to the inevitable closing rhyme—his options for a coherent finish 
dwindle even while he builds his final sentence. Or consider a comedy 
improv team—like The Second City—taking a few cues from an audi-
ence and collectively riffing it into a coherent story punctuated by belly 
laughs and irony. Now envision a team of digital engineers doing some 
“outside the box” brainstorming, as they work to invent a new app. Or 
slow it down and we find the Darwins and Einsteins of science testing 
and trying fresh theoretical solutions to the nagging mysteries of nature.
The shared element in these diverse activities is the enigmatic engine 
of human creativity, the improvising imagination. Human culture itself 
is impossible without the imagination, and yet we know very little about 
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it. Why does a story evoke a whole world inside us? How are we able to 
rehearse a skill or an event in our mind’s eye? How does creativity go 
beyond experience to make something altogether new? And how does 
the moral imagination help us improvise our way toward a more ethical 
society?
Artists often consider the imagination their unique provenance, but 
the imagination drives everything from engineering, marketing, cos-
mology, economics, and ethics. Aristotle described the imagination as a 
faculty in humans (and most other animals) that produces, stores, and 
recalls the images used in a variety of cognitive and volitional activities. 
Even our sleep is energized by the dreams of our involuntary imagina-
tion. Immanuel Kant saw the imagination as a synthesizer of sensibility 
and understanding. Freud saw it as a release system for antisocial desires. 
And recent neuroimaging reveals that a prefrontal and temporal lobe cir-
cuit enables us to pro ject ourselves into different times and places—the 
imagination is our inner time- traveler.
We live in a world that is only partly happening. We also live in co- 
present simultaneous worlds made up of “almosts” or “what ifs” and 
I.1.#Trumpet player Miles Davis (1926–1991) is considered one of the great improvisers of 
several jazz traditions, including cool jazz, hard bop, modal jazz, and jazz fusion.
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“maybes.” At the moment that I’m failing at some task, for example, I’m 
simultaneously running a success scenario of my actions, and this imagi-
nary reality is creating real emotions inside me. Or I see this open grassy 
field here, but also see (through imagination) my future home that will 
be built on this empty plot. Imagination is the possibility maker. It is the 
home of hope and regret.
What is the relationship between improvisation and imagination? The 
issue is fraught with ambiguity. The philosophical and the artistic tradi-
tions have considered the imagination as a mental faculty that mediates 
between the particulars of the senses (e.g., luminous blue colors) and the 
universals of our conceptual understanding (e.g., the judgment that Marc 
Chagall’s blue America Windows is beautiful or sunrises are beautiful). Phi-
losophers (from Aristotle through Kant, and beyond) have focused on the 
I.2.#Hip-hop artists often “battle” each other with freestyle rap techniques. The artists 
take turns delivering spoken poetry that has not been rehearsed, and often incorporate 
spontaneous commentary on the opponent’s appearance and skill level (not to mention 
the dubious character of their respective mothers).
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unique forms of judgment that arise from imagination. But I will argue 
(respectfully) that this tradition over- intellectualizes the imagination.
The philosophers characterize imagination as a kind of cognition rather 
than embodied action. This common mistake demotes the imagination to 
a kind of weak knowledge—making it derivative or secondary to “real 
knowledge.” From Aristotle to the present, philosophers and scientists 
have tended to think of real knowledge as a process of seeing through 
the particular cases to the universal rules or laws that govern them. This 
search for formal properties ignores sensual particulars in favor of con-
ceptual universals. For example, we see that this man has a snub nose, this 
other man is bald, this man is young, this one old, this one hungry, this 
one tall, et cetera, but eventually we see past all this to recognize their 
shared defining features: they are all rational, featherless bipeds. The com-
mon defining features are the real objects of knowledge, according to this 
long-standing tradition.
Against this universalizing approach, the imagination stays close to 
particular sensual impressions—the snub nose and the baldness of the 
men are more relevant (e.g., the hunchback is not subtractable from 
Quasi modo of Notre- Dame). Often the imagination adds many traits 
rather than subtracting them, as in the case of flying pigs, talking animals, 
and composite hybrid creatures like mermaids, griffins, and even gods 
like the Hindu Ganesh. The imagination is interested in the particular. If 
imagination captures a universal—and it frequently does—it is emotional 
rather than conceptual, as when a theatrical tragedy (rich with particular 
detail) captures a universal aspect of grief or love.
I will draw upon the philosophers when their ideas about the imagi-
nation are relevant, but my interests are closer to the common layperson’s 
use of “imagination” as a creative power. Creativity must be broadly 
understood as an intellectual, artistic, and even bodily form of investiga-
tion and expression.
Improvisation, in my account, will be the main activity, method, or 
operation of the imaginative faculty. Improvisation, more accurately, is 
not just what the imagination does, but is the adaptive meeting place be-
tween the organism and the environment. The improvising imagination 
draws on internal resources (i.e., thoughts, feelings, behaviors) and envi-
ronmental resources (i.e., this tool, this pigment, this rock) in service of 
various end goals. As we will learn, the rapid activity of real- time prob-
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lem solving is where improvisation shines, but a common cognitive ar-
chitecture underlies the slower, cool-headed forms of imaginative plan-
ning as well. Improvising a can opener and designing one take place in 
two different timescales, but both processes draw on similar mind- body 
equipment.
It is rare for imagination to engage in free- play synthesis with no pur-
pose whatsoever. We like to think of imaginative improvisation as com-
pletely unfettered, but it rarely is. And if it were, it would be more like 
uninteresting noise. As spontaneous creativity inevitably becomes more 
bounded by specific goals (e.g., technology, procreation, play, catharsis, 
prediction), it comes under greater executive control. My team riffs and 
brainstorms ideas, for example, but those riffs are channeled toward the 
different goals depending on whether my team is a corporate group, a sci-
entific research team, a TV drama’s writers, or a baseball team. We break 
improvisation into conventional taxonomies or headings, like humanities 
or fine arts or sciences, but the “mechanics” or processes of the underlying 
creativity share many common features.
The activity of improvising furnishes us with a fresh model for grasp-
ing how the imagination works, and one that does not fall victim to the 
overly intellectual approach. The intellectual or overly “cognitive” ap-
proach to the mind considers thinking as a kind of internal talking. The 
inner conversation of our thought is bound by language structures and 
functions—our thinking is a rapid blather of propositions. According to 
this dominant cognitivist view, imagining and other forms of thinking 
are ways of bringing together representations (like memories and con-
cepts) into novel combinations, governed by linguistic grammar. But I 
will argue that the imagination is not information processing. The bi-
nary logic of computation, so effective in artificial intelligence (AI), is the 
wrong starting place for understanding the imagination. It’s not wrong 
because we should all be “mysterians” about the mind and ascribe to it 
supernatural miraculous powers. It’s wrong because an algorithmic ap-
proach fails to grasp the emotional and bodily basis of imagination.
We should think of “imagining”—the verb form, rather than imagina-
tion as a mental faculty. In this way we’ll see greater connection between 
improvisation and imagination. Ultimately, however, these relatively un-
conscious processes have been hidden from any direct examination and 
only glimpsed obliquely or inferred from their finished creative products.
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Thinking of the imagination as a process is more consistent with brain 
science as well. There is no imagination organ buried in the neuroana-
tomical structures of the brain. Several candidates for location have come 
and gone, most popular of which is the idea that the right hemisphere 
houses imagination. But data suggest no clear localization of creativity, 
and the most that can be said with confidence is that communication be-
tween brain regions is very high in imaginative people. The brain activity 
during the creative process is widely scattered, and we will learn that 
imaginative improvisation draws on many systems (e.g., motor, imagery, 
language, emotions, etc.).
Using other philosophical traditions (e.g., phenomenology, pragma-
tism, biosemantics, etc.) and recent scientific research (e.g., Ap Dijkster-
huis’s Unconscious Lab, affective neuroscience, etc.), I will argue that 
improvisation (spontaneous creation) is the fundamental process that 
underlies downstream achievements of both scientific and artistic imagi-
nation. Moreover, the improvising imagination has more access to knowl-
edge (more epistemic power) than most modern philosophers, scientists, 
and even artists have been willing to consider.
We are always engaged in mental improv, but the stakes seem low 
because most of us are not doing it onstage in front of an audience. And 
while high-risk, onstage improvisation brings unique emotional and cog-
nitive ingredients, we are all in dangerous territory whenever we strike 
out toward new intellectual and social terrain. The danger is, of course, 
also the attraction. Playing a jazz solo or a cadenza seems like high- stakes 
improvisation, but try parenting, marrying, soldiering, or feeling your 
way around a new religion. Real life is also high-stakes improvisation.
In this book, I will take care to explore archetypical cases of human 
improvisation—general intelligence processes that probably came on-
line before the Upper Paleolithic (before 50,000 years ago), but remain 
with us today in culturally transformed processes, including music, so-
cial interaction, storytelling, religion, and technology. These examples 
will help to clarify the complex relationships between improvisation and 
imagination, and hopefully give us a privileged glimpse into the unique 
nature of our evolved primate minds.1
The improvising imagination is one of the little-explored phenomena 
that uniquely unify the humanities and biology. In it, we find the cre-
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ativity that first emerged in our adaptive innovations (e.g., technologi-
cal and social advancements), our involuntary free-play compositions 
of dreaming, our adaptive mythologies, and our highest human artistic 
achievements.
It is common for some evolutionary psychologists to reduce the mind 
to a set of computations (domain- specific problem- solving circuits) and 
project them into the Pleistocene era. Our mind, according to this modu-
lar approach, is a series of specific circuits or modules that evolved to solve 
specific problems—for example, avoiding poisonous plants is a mind cir-
cuit, detecting people who cheat is a mind circuit, finding a fertile mate 
is a mind circuit, and so on. However, this view of highly specialized 
circuits is heavily contested. Our improvising skills and our imagina-
tive powers, for example, almost certainly grow out of general intelli-
gence capabilities, not specific modules. Indeed, our improvising mind 
is the very opposite of a hardwired module or circuit, because it cannot 
be dedicated to one or two functions and seems available to all manner 
of problem- solving experiments. Improvisation is the anti- module. I will ar-
ticulate sensible scenarios of early adaptive imagination, as corroborated 
in comparative primate studies, anthropology, childhood developmental 
psychology, and social psychology. But I will also give great weight to 
the unique semantics of culture and the humanities proper, all the while 
keeping track of the cognitive, social, and emotional prerequisites that 
evolved to get us here today.
Humanities scholars have long argued that imagination allows us to 
enter the life and mind of another person or people, giving us the real-
ization of common humanity, moral understanding, and tolerance.2 Our 
improvisations as a virtual other self require cognitive structures for pro-
jecting identity and difference, as well as emotional systems undergird-
ing care and empathy. Philosophy will help articulate these faculties and 
functions. Moreover, beyond any evolutionary justification, aesthetics 
(as an autonomous discipline) reveals which kinds of stories work well 
or badly, which kinds of images and melodies move us or fail, and what 
makes an improvisation beautiful, ugly, or sublime. My approach will be 
pluralist, not reductionist. As a philosopher, part of my job is conceptual 
engineering—informed by the latest evolutionary science. Tracking the 
evolution of improvisation requires me to reverse- engineer a contempo-
rary skill into its ancestral parts and capacities. But I will try to validate 
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these findings with evidence from the life sciences and the humanities, 
and my claim is that many of these ancestral capacities are still available 
in our contemporary creative activities.
Books about creativity have tended to fall into one of three genres. On 
the one hand, there have been the breathless and overreaching feel- good 
paeans to famous entrepreneurs and successful CEO creatives. This kind of 
book is crammed with amusing but shallow factoids and over-interpreted 
fMRI studies, all wrapped in a vaguely inspirational glaze. Next, we have 
the how- to books that give artists a series of exercises to unblock their 
creative flow. These books are either therapeutic or instructive, or both, 
and seek to nurture the joy of our inner prodigy. The third genre is the 
impenetrable academic baffler, chock-full of erudite and cryptic refer-
ences to Foucault and the hegemonic phallocentric horizon of being, but 
otherwise devoid of illumination.
This book, by contrast, will be a broadly philosophical exploration of 
the origins and meanings of human improvisation and creativity. Fans of 
those other books will hopefully find much of interest here too, but this 
project is more foundational.
So, what is new and possibly groundbreaking in this book? Perhaps the 
most unique aspect is that I am reversing the traditional order of things, 
both logically and chronologically. Improvising did not emerge recently 
as some rarified elite employment of otherwise pedestrian symbols and 
behaviors. It was, instead, the driving force in our natural history. Our 
ancestors’ forms of communication were prelinguistic, embodied gestu-
ral modes that served social needs. These mimicry forms of communi-
cation presumably emerged from affective/emotional adaptations that 
were long under construction in mammals. Grooming, body language, 
motherese, gesture, play, and other learned nonlinguistic communication 
preceded the cognitive revolution that language instigated. But contem-
porary cognitive science and evolutionary psychology have failed to take 
the primate social niche, and even the body, seriously.3
I will be arguing that the manipulation (improvisation) of information-
rich perceptions/memories/image schemas/bodily gestures is born out 
of our primate social, emotional needs. Our intellect is a product and ser-
vant of our social life, and the improvising imagination—our early intel-
lect—gave us the behavioral/mental scaffolding to organize and manage 
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our experience long before words and concepts. The improvising imagi-
nation typifies the flexibility of human mind, but the dates and the prox-
imate triggers of such flexibility remain somewhat obscured in prehis-
tory.
Following anthropologist Steven Mithen, I argue that a crucial feature 
of Homo sapiens’ mind is “cognitive fluidity.”4 This fluidity breaks down 
the dedicated brain circuitry that ties one action response to one stimulus. 
Our minds become less machine-like because we can entertain counter-
factual images and enlist alternative responses. Most evolutionary psy-
chologists claim that the cause of this cognitive fluidity was the devel-
opment of language (in the late Pleistocene), because language provides 
an obvious syntactical/grammatical system for manipulating representa-
tions. This system seemed to be the perfect girder network for expanding 
the inner head space of flexible cognition. But more recently, Mithen has 
argued that another system—namely, music—coevolved in parallel with 
language and gave pre- sapiens similar ways of projecting possible futures.
My argument takes this insight one step further, suggesting that, 
more than just music per se, a suite of creative abilities—dance, image, 
music, gesture, et cetera, which are more proximate to the body than 
language—built an inner space and behavioral space of options that freed 
Homo from the more deterministic patterns of other hominids. These cre-
ative improvisation skills emerged from earlier mammalian habits that 
manage resource exploitation and social cohesion, and they were emo-
tionally (affectively) driven (i.e., habits like grooming and play fighting). 
Play, for example, would be selected for because it allows mammals to 
take threats (and dominance) off-line and rehearse for them in safe envi-
ronments. And such proto-imagination play is done largely through the 
body, without much cognitive motivation or even understanding. From 
such lowly origins, a discernible thread can be traced all the way to Ein-
stein’s reputed claim that “play is the highest form of research.”5
Some scholars have pursued the embodied metaphorical structures 
within language itself, and their work is important evidence that meaning 
is rooted in the body (not the head).6 But I am more interested in explor-
ing the evolutionary period before explicit language, as well as our con-
temporary access to that prelinguistic mode of meaning. I’m trying to ex-
plore the phase of mind above purely behaviorist stimulus-and-response, 
but below linguistic metaphors and propositional meaning. This histori-
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cal moment (probably initiated during the early Pleistocene, circa 2 mil-
lion years ago) is replicated or recapitulated, I believe, in the processes of 
our contemporary improvisational activities. The improvising musician, 
dancer, athlete, or engineer is drawing directly on the prelinguistic reser-
voir or meaningful communication. A music improviser or even a back-
packer traveling in an exotic land without knowing the local language 
has to tap into that ancient call-and-response logic of body language and 
emotional expression in order to navigate properly. We try this move 
and watch for a response, try that move and watch. We dodge and parry 
this incoming gesture, accept that one. Flying by the seat of our pants, in 
these cases, is not just some analogy to prelinguistic communication—it 
is the thing itself.
This may well be the most controversial aspect of the book—that 
we might all have regular access to the ancestral mind. My thesis is that 
we have some direct access, albeit murky, to prelinguistic Homo intelli-
gence, and this subjective experience can be intersected with the scien-
tific methodologies of anthropology and evolutionary psychology. My 
job will be to expose the reader to some of this fascinating new research 
in the human sciences and reveal the connections with our own imagina-
tive experiences. Trying to infer whether Neanderthals were cognitively 
modern from evidence of their ancient funerals is a worthy research pro-
gram, but I want to augment such approaches with a systematic intro-
spection of our own nonlinguistic consciousness. There is nothing spooky 
or mystical about this approach. I will be trying to articulate the dynamics 
of our embodied improvisational activities.
My approach is part of a growing research movement that seeks to 
ground meaning (biosemantics) in the embodied interaction of social pri-
mates. As great apes, we humans almost certainly engaged in the kind of 
subtle, antiphonal, body- language communication that we see through-
out all social primates. Primate psychologists, like Louise Barrett, for 
example, are starting to track the malleable interaction networks that 
build up slowly in the course of development, giving primates the prox-
imate lexicon of signifying gestures that will ultimately serve the bigger 
functions of dominance and submission, mating, alliance, food sharing, 
provisioning, and so on.7 My argument is that we, too, operate in these 
embodied gestural systems of meaning much more than we usually ac-
knowledge. The reigning paradigm in both the humanities and the sci-
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ences is that meaning is linguistically grounded—propositional, infer-
ential, and largely indicative. My argument is that this level of meaning 
rides on top of a deeper and older level—bodily, associational, and largely 
imperative (normative).
Art making is a realm that actually demonstrates these deeper lexi-
cons of social communication. Jazz is a great case study of this realm 
of meaning, but it is just a token of a capacious type of adaptive human 
mind. Collective art making, especially in real time, manifests call- and- 
response meaning, but even solitary imaginative improvisation (the 
painter or writer) internalizes the social interaction within the practi-
tioner.8 In some cases, the improviser is “talking to herself ” (generaliz-
ing a social other) as she composes an artwork—and while such work is 
more linguistic (propositional and representational), many art-making 
scenarios entail an inner “conversation” that is much more image based, 
impressionistic, embodied, and even liminally unconscious.
Call-and-response is one of the oldest improvisational techniques, 
as is synchronization of our melodies and our body movements (like in 
dance). These are ancient procedures for cementing communities, cap-
tured in performances that express emotion and draw out emotion. Such 
techniques allow us to explore open- ended options at the fringes of so-
cial and technological rules. Eventually such socially constrained explo-
ration evolves into more and more off-line experimentation, growing 
into forms of thinking with images, with sounds, with gestures.
Our primate cousins have impressive abilities (grounded in the cere-
bellum) for sequencing motor activities—they have a kind of grammar 
for processing inedible plants into edible food, for example. This is a level 
of problem solving that seeks order (and “banks” successes and failures) 
between the body and the ecological potentials. I will argue that this kind 
of motor sequencing is the first level of improvisational grammar. Fol-
lowing this foundation, another level of image-schema manipulation—
like mental rotation and eventually image narrative—piggybacks upon 
body grammar. And finally, only much later, did we start thinking with 
linguistic symbols.
Computational theories of mind may resonate with our late Pleisto-
cene linguistic thinking, but not with our earlier image cognition. We 
encode and manipulate image schema and gestural schema, and thereby 
form the basis of subsequent metaphorical meaning. I suspect that it is 
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this thinking with images, sounds, and gestures that kicks off the cogni-
tive fluidity marking our psychological modernity. As Eric Kandel puts 
it in his Age of Insight, “Perhaps in human evolution the ability to express 
ourselves in art—in pictorial language—preceded the ability to express 
ourselves in spoken language. As a corollary, perhaps the processes in the 
brain that are important for art were once universal but were replaced as 
the universal capability for language evolved.”9 I submit that the pictorial 
and gestural languages are still with us, and when we quiet our discursive 
consciousness long enough—like in improvisational activities—we can 
still converse in these more ancient tongues.
Besides the biophilosophy approach, this book draws upon my learning 
in both Western and Eastern wisdom traditions, and promises to be a 
cross-cultural investigation. I have had the good fortune to live, study, 
and teach in Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and China. I have sig-
nificant experience in the Western educational paradigm that treasures 
innovation and imagination, as well as a Chinese paradigm that prizes 
structure and mastery of time-worn rules and precedents. These contrast-
ing civilizations are in a contemporary conversation about the value of 
the improvising imagination for future education. So, in addition to the 
evolutionary origins, we will also look at the possible future of improvi-
sation as an engine of cultural success.
I’ve taught creative young people at a fine and performing arts col-
lege for twenty years, and I’ve researched creativity for decades and road-
tested ideas in my classrooms. But more importantly, I’ve been a profes-
sional jazz/blues musician for twenty-five years, having the privilege of 
playing all around the country with some of my heroes—including Bo 
Diddley, Buddy Guy, Koko Taylor, B.B. King, and countless other great 
musicians. I’ve also worked as a professional illustrator, designing books, 
magazine articles, and websites. These experiences give me an insider’s 
perspective on improvisation and help guide my exploration of both the 
inspiration and craft of creativity.
I’ve chosen to weave the entire book with the story of a specific jazz 
performance. The quintessential American form of improvisation, jazz, 
is a perfect paradigm—organized, flexible, adaptive, emotional, logical, 
and occasionally chaotic. The Evolution of Imagination is a jam session in six 
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chapters. But don’t worry if your jazz or musical vocabulary is not up to 
speed. I’m more concerned with the dynamics below the surface of any 
one example of improv. The jazz description will focus more on the so-
cial experimentalism of group performance and not music theory per se. 
Most of what we’ll find at work in a swinging jazz combo can just as easily 
be found in a pickup basketball game, product development team meet-
ing, political diplomacy session, or tribal hunting party.
Each chapter will trade between two dominant melody lines: our real-
time, in-the-moment uses of improvisation, and the origin and evolution 
of those imaginative powers. It will be an ontogenetic (individual devel-
opment) and phylogenetic (species development) concert. How do we 
meaningfully dance today, for example, and how did the practice evolve 
in the first place? How do we use storytelling today, for example, and how 
did storytelling itself originate? How do I improvise in my daily life today, 
and how did improvisational thinking itself evolve in our ancestors?
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“I asked, ‘Do you have an electric dermatome?’” she recounted, hoping to 
use the surgical instrument commonly used in the United States to produce 
uniformly thin slices of skin for grafting. “They said, ‘Yes,’ and handed me a 
12- inch- long knife.”
D O C T O R S W I T H O U T  B O R D E R S S U R G E O N  S H E R RY  W R E N ,  I M P R O V I S I N G 
W H I L E  T R E AT I N G  A N  E M E R G E N C Y  PAT I E N T  I N  C H A D ,  A F R I C A
What we did . . . you couldn’t ever write down for an orchestra to play. That’s 
why I didn’t write it all out, not because I didn’t know what I wanted; I knew 
that what I wanted would come out of a process and not some prearranged 
shit. The session was about improvisation, and that’s what makes jazz so fabu-
lous. Anytime the weather changes it’s going to change your whole attitude 
about something, and so a musician will play differently. . . . A musician’s atti-
tude is the music he plays.
M I L E S D AV I S
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C O U N T I N G  O F F
The upright bass player asks the pianist for an E. The note rings out amidst 
the clinking highball glasses and the audience murmurs. He winds his 
tuning peg slowly to find where the pitch warble unifies into an even 
tone. The tenor sax player wants to hear a C note, honks briefly, and then 
adjusts his mouthpiece until the note trues. The drummer downs a shot 
of whiskey and throws the lever on his snare drum. He feels the weight 
of the sticks in his hands and considers switching to brushes instead. He 
decides to wait, wondering what the first tune will be, hoping it’ll be an 
up- tempo song and not a ballad.
The pianist rolls up his sleeves and cycles through some minor chords, 
realizing the middle octave F# key is sharp. He winces and resolves to 
work with it anyway. No choice. Meanwhile the guitar player adjusts his 
amplifier, tweaking the treble dial and checking it against the idiosyn-
cratic acoustics of the room.
The musicians are working through an ancient ritual of collective 
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music making, adjusting their specific instruments and getting them in 
harmony with the others. Also, they are readying their bodies: limber-
ing the right muscles, stretching the tension out of some, and tightening 
others, cracking knuckles, clearing throats, and tuning their eyes and ears 
to each other and the room of spectators. In short, the human imagination 
is slowly assembling its ingredients before improvisational combustion.
The piano player waves his hand and everybody leans in.
“Let’s play the old Van Heusen tune ‘Imagination.’” Heads nod; the 
tenor player smiles. “But don’t play it like the Ella ballad. Let’s speed up 
and swing it—”
“Wait,” the bassist interjects. “I don’t think I know the bridge on that 
one.”
“Don’t worry,” the guitar player says. “Just follow me—you’ll get it.”
“One, and two, and three, and . . .”
:  :  :
We’re off. Something as simple as a count-off is deeply complex when 
we consider the cognitive and even bodily anticipation required to com-
municate and then create a melody and rhythm. The musician creates a 
one- measure virtual reality of what’s coming, and everyone has to feel it 
together to embark on the real- world version that audiences can enjoy. 
The count-off is an imaginative act that produces the future—it starts 
actualizing one groove from the myriad potential interpretations of the 
jazz standard “Imagination.” The ability to “get ready, set, go” is unique 
to higher animals. It allows us to prepare and create what’s coming next, 
rather than just responding to stimuli.
Predators excel at the metaphorical count- off because it helps them 
anticipate and catch what’s coming or going. Long before the count-
off was a mental preparation, it was a bodily preparation—getting our 
muscles and limbs ready, our heart racing, our game face on. The earliest 
form of imagination, in the embodied mind, is anticipation.
Now imagine you’re on a Pleistocene hunting foray with your little 
band of Homo erectus tribesmen. Anticipation is crucial. The ability to 
throw a projectile and hit a moving target is an astounding piece of adap-
tive calculation—a crude first step of imaginative prediction. Throwing 
a projectile requires anatomical evolution (expansion of the waist, and a 
more twistable humerus) but also new cognitive/perceptual skills. The 
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hunter needs to simulate internally what the prey animal might do next. 
Other non- human animals make such predictions, but they do not hunt 
with well- aimed projectiles. And perhaps most importantly, all this co-
operative action and predictive skill requires some kind of apprentice-
ship. My readiness potential has to be directed and educated. Our ances-
tors survived because an early imaginative culture helped improvise and 
transmit cooperative hunting and gathering.
Did the hunting party improvise their way to dinner by conceptually 
modeling the environment and drawing logical inferences about where 
the wildebeest or buffalo will be next? If so, they would have needed 
mental concepts and inferential logic to manipulate them. Or did they 
feel their way to each successive move by some simpler experiential tech-
nique—following a bodily rehearsed series of motor sequences? These 
sorts of questions will become paramount as we track the capacity for 
improvisation. But I’m getting ahead of myself. We first need to consider 
some fundamental properties of the improvising imagination.
S O M E  C R U C I A L  I N G R E D I E N T S
Improvisation is found in so many varied activities that it is difficult to 
isolate the essential or defining characteristics. We often know it, when 
we see it, but strict definitions rule out some good candidate activities. 
Too narrow a focus on MacGyver- or Rube Goldberg–type engineering 
may rule out certain features of musical improvisation, and vice versa. 
But if the definition is too broad, then everything becomes improvisation 
and we don’t gain insight into the crucial elements. At the risk of missing 
certain contours of the phenomenon, I’ll propose some key features of 
improvisation—with the Wittgensteinian caveat that such practices have 
a family resemblance to each other rather than a definite dictionary agree-
ment. Many of these key features are so intimately related to one another, 
they cannot be entirely teased apart.
Spontaneity is a key feature. Improvisers are seemingly artless and natu-
ral, generating their work from within themselves. There is a notable 
freedom of process that produces novel responses to a situation in real 
time. Planning may be an implicit phase, but not particularly overt. With-
out spontaneity, the moves become predictable and the activity is rote 
rather than dynamic. In art, a lack of spontaneity creates artworks that are 
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stilted and mannered. Similarly, in social interaction, spontaneity saves us 
from overly scripted communication and robotic body language. Relax-
ing our expectations about formal rules of engagement often allows for 
a more authentic unrehearsed expression of feeling and a more receptive 
read of others’ expressions.
Intuitive. The meaning of intuition is arguable, of course. The history of 
modern philosophy and theology has tended to contrast intuitive experi-
ence or intuitive knowledge as that which does not first enter through the 
five senses (the gateways of empirical knowledge). For that reason, it is 
sometimes characterized poetically as a sixth sense, as it delivers a knowl-
edge state inside the subject without the usual perceptual mediation. But 
this view, favored by mystics of all stripes, can be contrasted with a more 
mundane (and scientific) approach to intuition. This more naturalistic 
use of “intuitive” describes the very subtle systems of animal awareness, 
mostly unconscious, that we all possess, such as body- position awareness 
(proprioception), personal space (proxemics), and arousal states that trig-
ger instincts like fight or flight. They are physiological responses to envi-
ronment, rooted in the central and peripheral nervous systems. Improvis-
ers draw upon this reservoir as they act.
Adaptive. Improvisation that has no direction whatsoever will hold 
some interest for us later, but such aimless riffing (even the free associa-
tions of surrealism) eventually seek to fit (adapt) an organism to an en-
vironment, a structure to a function, a part to a whole. Even the most 
wandering free play of thought or gesture can be an exploration of the 
potential in a given material or scenario. Improvisation is often a research 
mechanism or method of adapting means to ends. In the 1920s, psycholo-
gists demonstrated how chimpanzees could stack boxes together and 
build poles to reach food.1 Since then we’ve had countless studies reveal-
ing the engineering improvisations of primates and other mammals. Of 
course, humans are masters of repurposing materials to new functions—
turning reading glasses into fire starters, dental floss into fishing line, and 
duct tape into everything else. The improviser’s survival may not be at 
stake in all these cases of adaptation, but we can appreciate that good im-
prov improves the organism or has that potential.
Resource deficiency is often a key feature of improvisation. The perfectly 
provisioned kitchen or toolshed has an implement for every eventuality. 
Perusing posh shopping magazines introduces one to devices like the 
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Grillbot Automatic Grill Cleaner robot and the Rosle Egg Cracker tool as 
well as the Parmesan cheese gouger. In this exclusive world, there is a pre-
set tool and solution for every problem, but this is not the domain of the 
improviser. The improviser does not have the optimal resources needed 
for a given problem. And this paucity of resources is the very condition 
of creativity because it forces a kind of lateral thinking. From the survi-
valist who conquers the jungle with just the contents of his pockets, to 
the urban entrepreneur who entertains crowds of tourists with a bucket 
instead of a drum kit, the improvisers are usually short on supplies.
Various “junkyard war” competitions help students learn about de-
sign and engineering, by posing objectives (e.g., make a floating vessel) 
and then presenting them with suboptimal construction materials. Such 
challenges reveal the social aspects of improvisation, but also the paradox 
of resource deficiency. The worse off the materials appear to be, the more 
creative the competitors must become.
Natural or self-imposed disciplines. Chuck Jones (1912–2002) was one of 
the twentieth century’s greatest animators, giving us Bugs Bunny, Daffy 
Duck, and Wile E. Coyote, to name just a few. As an imaginative impro-
viser, working with the freest medium, he could make animals float in the 
air, fly through walls, and walk away from devastating injuries. In addi-
tion to great character development, his cartoons are captivating because 
he carefully constructed world rules or “disciplines” that he and the art-
ists strictly obeyed in the creation of the stories. A few of his disciplines 
for the Road Runner and Coyote cartoons are listed in his book Chuck 
Amuck: The Life and Times of an Animated Cartoonist: “1. The Road Runner 
cannot harm the Coyote except by going ‘beep beep.’ 2. No outside force 
can harm the Coyote—only his ineptitude or the failure of Acme prod-
ucts. 3. The Coyote could stop anytime—if he were not a fanatic. . . . 6. All 
action must be confined to the natural environment of the two charac-
ters—the Southwest American desert.” And so on.2
The creativity of the practitioner must be bounded by real or imagi-
nary physics or rules that give consistency and predictability even to the 
most fantastical scenarios. The audience enters into these disciplines con-
sciously or unconsciously and accords their expectations. This aspect—
agreed-upon conventions—crosses many domains and media (e.g., musi-
cal genres have indigenous scales for improvisation). Even the most 
iconoclastic improvisational departures are in a relationship, albeit rebel-
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lious, with the conventional disciplines or rules. The disciplines keep im-
provisation from being nonsense.
Emergency or high- stakes conditions. Of course, many improvisations are 
successful under the low- pressure, no- stress conditions of leisure. Many 
musicians will successfully explore entirely new territory on their instru-
ments when the audience is sparse and undistinguished, and many engi-
neers will improvise their best work when the boss is no longer look-
ing over their shoulder. But most accomplished improvisers recognize 
that they “up their game” when the stakes are high. Improvisers are not 
afraid of vulnerability, or at least they overcome their fear and regularly 
put themselves in vulnerable situations. It is common for jazz musicians, 
for example, to schedule gigs in front of audiences and then refuse to re-
hearse ahead of time. This will force them to bring their most skillful 
and responsive selves to the performance and challenge the other players 
to do the same. A little desperation and anxiety go a long way to focus 
the mind and the players in any collective project. And the no- rehearsal 
model also ensures that the performance will be a unique one- of- a- kind 
event, reflecting a cultural apotheosis (and possibly spiritual celebration) 
of the very moment of improvisation.
1.1.#It is common for jazz musicians to schedule gigs in front of audiences and then 
refuse to rehearse ahead of time. This will force them to bring their most skillful and re-
sponsive selves to the performance, and challenge the other players to do the same.
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This last point brings us quite naturally to another important feature: 
improvisation is simultaneously performative and compositional. Whether it’s 
building a house, a sermon, or a pop song, most projects entail a separate 
composition and performance phase. But improvisation combines these 
two phases. This is clear to see in things like jazz and comedy improvi-
sation, where the practitioner is simultaneously expressing some idea or 
gesture and fitting it into a larger compositional framework (i.e., the solo 
inside a song, the riff inside the comedy sketch). One performs in a Janus- 
faced mode, looking inward to the next move and outward to the accru-
ing arrangement. And, importantly, the composition is finished at every 
moment, because the improviser cannot stop to do things over again. 
Unlike in a recording studio or on an architect’s drafting table, the im-
proviser cannot erase. The phrases we try, as improvisers, cannot be taken 
back, and they go out into the social world as public gestures. Trying new 
things in improvisation is not a practice or rehearsal for performance, but 
the thing itself. Thankfully, there is a high tolerance in improvising com-
munities for “warts” and “wrong turns.”
If we switch from a jazz combo example to a hunting party, then we 
see that tolerance must have its limits too. A member of the hunting party 
who is always trying new hunting maneuvers can be an ineffective and 
possibly dangerous teammate. Much is made in anthropology literature 
about the freeloader problem, which is the challenge of dealing with a 
self-interested parasite member who won’t carry his weight in a coopera-
tive venture like hunting. But cooperative ventures need protection from 
the “overly creative” too.
In this context, we can see the vital importance of reliable clichés in im-
provisation. A good improviser has an arsenal of ready-made options to 
introduce into an immediate activity. Hunters have a division of labor, of 
course, but as individuals and as groups, they also have a series of reliable 
tricks to flush out, track, and kill prey. The improviser uses his clichés as 
scaffolding for subsequent deviations and novel moves, but introducing 
the right clichés at the right time is also an artful part of improvisation. 
The great musicians have signature riff and phrase preferences. The come-
dian has her go-to impersonations and prefabricated jokes. The athlete 
has her automatic patterns of forehand here and drop shot there. The im-
proviser must both develop meaningful clichés (for storage) and unpack 
or discharge them meaningfully (i.e., the right clichés at the right time).
Some of this reliance on clichés or prefabbed formulae is necessary 
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because it’s not possible to create spontaneously all the time. Moreover, 
improvisation is usually a social interaction, and formulaic moves allow 
others to make smart predictions about your movements—a crucial as-
pect of cooperative projects like hunting, music making, and even reli-
gious ritual.
From all of the above, we can already see that improvisation is function-
ally promiscuous or unlimited. It’s a skill set that operates in any domain. It’s a 
way of doing things rather than a specific body of information. As an end 
in itself, improvisation has all the pleasures and satisfactions of any intrin-
sic delight. The improvised comedy skit needs no utilitarian grounding 
to help us enjoy and appreciate it. But improvisation is also a means, and 
as such it can take up with almost any teleological goal. Improvisation is 
the engine of trial- and- error learning.
Like Darwinian evolution itself—comprised of chance mutation and 
natural selection—improvisation often tries or proposes a “solution,” and 
then the environment selects for or against it. Improvisation is an unsys-
tematic generate-and-test method for getting maximum grip on one’s 
situation. My strange bait caught the fish, for example, so I learn. My 
joke got no laugh, so I learn. My improvised blade cannot cut this hide, 
so I learn. My offering to the gods was rejected, so I learn. Out of these 
trial- and- error experiences, domain- specific patterns and rules emerge, 
but improvisation doesn’t deduce its solutions so much as fumbles toward 
them. And, save for certain problems that require exact precision (e.g., 
certain mathematical ones), the art of fumbling can solve many mam-
malian survival challenges.
Improvisation is rule governed in many cases, but casually so. It is a 
flexible practice that sees rules as elastic. Improv is serviceable rather than 
optimal, imprecise rather than exact, flexible rather than rigid. If I’m 
playing with a pianist who plays an A- minor chord, then I can play a 
solo in a pentatonic scale for a bluesy flavor, and I can throw in a Dorian 
modal phrase for darker shades and a natural minor or Aeolian mode, but 
I cannot do much with a C# note unless I’m deliberately flaunting the 
rules for dissonant purposes (and that might be fine too). The point is that 
the improvisational maneuvers already exist within a system of received 
conventions, but the constraint is usually gentle. Flint knapping had con-
ventions that governed its practice for hundreds of thousands of years, 
and they were tight enough to ensure success but loose enough to admit 
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maverick maneuvers and even virtuoso innovations. The Mozart of flint 
knapping must have broken many rules, but was also presumably recog-
nized as a positive force rather than a mere rule breaker.
One common form of improvisation is the mixing, or hybridizing, of 
frames. Pastiche can be seen as a major player in the improvising imagi-
nation. Once the person grasps the relevant rule systems or genre con-
ventions (the “frames”), she can create novel meaning by mixing those 
usually separate systems. The great cellist Yo-Yo Ma will regularly drop 
phrases from a country- and- western genre into a classical improvisation, 
or a Bach convention into a Chinese folk song, and so on. But larger genre 
mash-ups have also dominated the pastiche artworks of the postmodern 
era, wherein crime noir frames (dominant in the 1940s) are blended with 
science fiction narratives (e.g., Blade Runner, The Matrix), or rock and opera 
are melded into unprecedented configurations (e.g., Tommy, The Wall, 
American Idiot). Two or more well-entrenched frames can be fused to cre-
ate a fruitful new platform for further experimentation. Architects mix 
classical and modernist frames together to produce strange new facades 
and structures like the Bundeswehr Military History Museum in Dres-
den, and ballistics innovators mix grenade technology with rifle tech-
nology to produce novel weapons like the M203.
Within this broader tradition of pastiche, we might recognize a sub- 
branch of humor that often colors improvisation. Putting a blues riff in 
a polka tune or quoting Shakespeare in a comic strip can be extremely 
funny, in part because the juxtaposition is so unexpected. In improvi-
sational music, the performer is often creating something for two audi-
ences—the cognoscenti (the other musicians) and the hoi polloi (the gen-
eral public). Humorous frame bending and mixing often arise as players 
try to surprise each other, as well as the larger audience. Of course, there 
is little humor or irony in high-stakes survival improvisation, but in 
many other forms of experimentation, we find a self-reflexive awareness 
(a knowing wink) of the process itself.
In addition to all of the above, the improviser is emotionally or affec-
tively charged. Affect is a more physiologically oriented way of describ-
ing emotions, and we need to recognize that improvisation is steeped 
in moods, passions, and subjectively felt motivations. Common speech 
sometimes uses “affect” to describe a person’s expression of emotion, but 
the more accurate scientific meaning is different. An affect is a specific 
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bodily change that can give rise to a conscious feeling but need not. My 
emotion of anger, for example, is a subjective psychological experience 
that I can report, but it rests upon a specific physiochemical change in the 
brain and body (i.e., catecholamine neurotransmitters are released and 
produce a burst of energy, heart rate and breathing increase, blood pres-
sure rises, hormones like adrenaline spike, the amygdala becomes very 
active, and so on). Affect, then, is a way of describing this somewhat im-
personal physical process at the root of our felt emotion. Each primary 
emotion—like fear, lust, anger, and so on—has a specific brain-body 
pathway of chemical change that precedes or simultaneously constitutes 
our conscious emotion. In many cases we can use the words “emotion” 
and “affect” interchangeably, but occasionally it will be helpful to recog-
nize the formal difference.
The improviser is goaded or energized by an emotion of seeking or 
wanting, and he is driven by the all too familiar feeling of desire—having 
an “itch” that he is desperate to “scratch.”3 Desire is motivational, but 
many negative affects (e.g., performance anxiety, nervousness) also ac-
company the starting phases of improvisation and must be dealt with by 
the practitioner.
The affective systems that push improvisers at the beginning of their 
experimentation are joined by other emotional systems later in the pro-
cess. As I try new moves, I read the effects of those moves, and my assess-
ment of feedback (from the material or social environment) is emotional, 
bodily, intuitive. Often the speed of improvisation itself makes slower, 
deliberative, cognitive appraisal of feedback impossible, and the impro-
viser must rely on real-time gut reactions.
In addition to the affectively charged origins and in-process phases 
of improv, we would be remiss to ignore the exultations and miseries 
of the completion phase. Successfully completing an improvisation is a 
kind of emotional ecstasy that many people will recognize. One doesn’t 
need to be a performer to feel the sense of triumph that accompanies any 
successful project of flying by the seat of your pants. Effectively navigat-
ing a Beijing grocery store, for example, when you only know a handful 
of Chinese words can be a true joy. And, of course, creating a powerful 
musical solo or proposing a winning idea in a business brainstorm session 
can get a person high for days. Contrariwise, the failures are charged with 
powerful negative affects as well.
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Lastly, I want to begin an articulation—often returned to in this 
book—of the prerequisite imaginative faculties behind improvisation. Im-
provisation requires some basic aspects of the mammal operating system, 
like perception and emotional or affective circuitry. But we also need 
short- term and long- term memory storage and fast retrieval. We need 
classical and operant conditioning or associational systems. We need some 
kind of representational system that can take images, events, and ideas 
off- line (decoupled from immediate experience) and manipulate them 
for novel results. We need social learning abilities that undergird skill 
acquisition like materials crafting, food processing, language, and even 
moral norms.
Crucially, improvisation is not possible without some sort of human 
freedom, or way of discriminating and preferring some behavioral options 
over others. This means we need a specific kind of biopsychological oper-
ating system that makes such flexible maneuvers possible.
Some animals cannot improvise. As philosopher Daniel Dennett 
noticed (and many cognitive scientists repeated), the Sphex wasp has 
very rigid, constrained behavioral options.4 When the wasp returns to 
its burrow with food for its grubs to feed on, it first leaves the food on 
the threshold and enters to check the burrow. Devious scientists experi-
mented on Sphex behavior by repeatedly moving the food a few feet from 
the threshold whenever the wasp went inside the burrow. Each time the 
wasp exited the burrow, it went through the exact same behavior proto-
cols—dropping the rediscovered food at the threshold again and entering 
the burrow. The scientists repeatedly moved the food (up to forty repe-
titions), but the Sphex never learned to simply bring the food into the 
burrow directly and remained trapped in a seemingly endless action loop. 
The creature follows its biological script with great fidelity, but it is not 
a good improviser. By comparison, humans are virtuoso improvisers, and 
I will try, in this book, to articulate the suite of biocultural powers that 
make such virtuosity possible.
As I mentioned in the introduction, a few philosophers (notably Aris-
totle and Kant) have long recognized a faculty of imagination, but the 
parameters of its work and power have been narrowly circumscribed. 
I will broaden the notion by treating it as a mammalian set of aptitudes 
(comprised of bodily gestural lexicons, cognitive representational abili-
ties, perceptual knowledge, the memory-emotion complex, cultural 
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mechanisms of informational and emotional management, and, finally, 
rational decision-making powers). There will not be a specific “faculty” 
that houses all these powers, but rather a network of interconnecting sys-
tems. In this sense, my use of “faculty” is shorthand for a suite of affec-
tive and cognitive capacities that I will spell out as we proceed through 
the book.
Unlike most philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists, I’ll be ar-
guing that the heavy lifting in human creativity is borne by the emo-
tional brain (limbic system) rather than the rational brain (neocortex). 
The imaginative prerequisites that make us Homo sapiens rather than Sphex
emerge out of our primate heritage.
T H E  C A P TA I N  O R  T H E  M U S E ?
The freedom problem (above) has produced a bogus model of imagina-
tive improvisation—namely that there is a conductor, or captain (some-
times called “homunculus”), rationality inside me, and this captain does 
the decision making. The captain is an executive controller who winnows 
down the myriad options and commits us to a line of action. In writ-
ing a story, this model might make sense, because the author can slowly 
consider alternative scenarios for a plot or character and then rationally 
choose the best. In music improvisation, however, such a captain is pre-
sumably weighing all the note choices in the relevant scale and choosing 
the best note for a phrase. But the sheer speed of musical improvisation 
alone is enough to make us doubt the accuracy of this captain model, at 
least in regard to some creative activities.
On the other hand, the mysterious loss of self that most improvis-
ing practitioners experience has produced a second dubious model—the 
muse model of supernatural possession. We’ve romanticized creativity so 
completely that we’ve ended up with an impenetrable mystery inside our 
heads. Following the Greeks, we still think of our own creativity as a muse 
that descends upon us—a kind of spirit possession or miraculous madness 
that flooded through Van Gogh and John Lennon, but only trickles in 
you and me. We may not literally believe in muse possession anymore, 
but we haven’t yet replaced this romantic view with a better one. After 
the great Texas guitar improviser Stevie Ray Vaughan died, Eric Clapton 
paid tribute by describing him as “an open channel . . . music just flowed 
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through him.” And when I worked as a blues musician in Chicago, play-
ing with greats improvisers like Buddy Guy and B.B. King, I saw plenty 
of this “channeling” firsthand. It didn’t happen all the time or even most 
of the time, but when it did, it was something special.
We recognize that creative activity decenters the ego. This gives us 
some skepticism about the agency involved in imaginative improvisation. 
Recently, the new science-based mysterians (devotees of “the singularity” 
and other worshippers of transcendental wonder) have sounded almost 
theological in their claim that the cosmos is channeling through us, when 
we are in a hypnotic “flow” experience of sublime nature.5
What’s happening during this muse-like loss of agency, however, is 
rarely explored. We tend to equate this loss of executive control (i.e., the 
“captain” jumps ship) with a pseudo-religious ecstasy and give up any fur-
ther analytical approach. But throughout this book, I will break with the 
creativity mystics and try to say something about the unsayable. When we 
are in this decentered muse state, for example, we are often engaged in a 
highly associative process—what William James might call the “stream of 
consciousness.” The imaginative faculty is proficient at image associations, 
for instance, but also the faculty is extremely adept at mixed-media asso-
ciations. When we imagine, we blend pictures and propositions, memo-
ries and real-time experiences, sounds, stories, and feelings. The imagina-
tion is a multimedia processor that jumps laterally through connotations, 
rather than downward through logical inference. Much of this is un-
conscious, which is why the muse simile is so powerful, but this phase is 
followed by a reentry phase, where the free associations or stream of con-
sciousness is brought back under executive control and integrated into 
the more focused projects of the person (i.e., the return of the “captain”).
The captain and muse models are fairly unhelpful if taken alone, 
but we must recognize them as exaggerated aspects of creativity. Taken 
together, they give us two important phases of the imaginative process. 
Improvisation is a Janus- faced phenomenon, and we will have to keep an 
eye on its two faces. In fact, it is probably a three- faced deity (like a Bud-
dhist Asura) because the reentry phase is not just a return to quotidian 
coherence, but a new development (having productively waded in the 
stream of consciousness).
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M E TA P H Y S I C A L  I M A G I N AT I O N
We think of the imagination as powerful, and in chapter 6 we’ll consider 
its ability to shape the social world. But previous eras also believed that 
imaginative acts could transform physical matter directly. From the an-
cient alchemical doctrines of Hermes Trismegistus through the esoteric 
societies of the Renaissance and early modern period, the imagination 
was seen as a uniquely powerful tool for manipulating nature. The her-
metic and gnostic traditions viewed the world as a series of isomorphic 
associations, with aspects of the human form (shape, ratios, humors, etc.) 
as microcosmic mirrors of the macrocosmic world. In the same way that 
Plato’s demiurge gave shape and form to the physical universe (Timaeus), 
our imagination acted as a god within—able to create worlds of mean-
ing and even causal changes in the physical world. Paracelsus (1493–1541) 
called the imagination the “inner star,” aiming not at fantasy but at the 
Platonic Ideas (eide). A common belief among the pagan alchemists was 
that the trained imagination could capture the departing soul of a person, 
transform that soul into a good force (a pseudo- deity) or bad (demon), 
and then replant the soul into a statue or icon image (thereby giving the 
spirit a new body). In this state—as a magical artwork—the icon, if be-
nevolent, could be appealed to for help with health problems, or, if de-
monic, for help with vengeance against enemies.6
A less magical tradition of imagination still conceived it as having di-
rect causal force in the world. More than just a mirror of experience and 
inventor of fantasy, the imagination had a mechanical aspect too. More 
than just a mental faculty, the imagination had intimate causal connection 
with the whole body. If you weren’t careful with your imagination, you 
could harm yourself and others.
Before the rise of scientific embryology and sophisticated develop-
mental biology, we did not fully understand the causal relationships be-
tween a parent’s mind/body and their offspring’s mind/body. Truth be 
told, we still don’t know a lot, and the recent field of epigenetics suggests 
that there is much still to learn. Nonetheless, we feel justified in think-
ing of the imagination as a purely psychological “mixer” of previously 
received perceptions, and these inner mash-ups have no physical effects 
beyond the brain of the imaginer. Through most of history, however, 
and even in contemporary cultures, people have seen the imagination as 
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a metaphysical force. If I imagine disturbing things, for example, will my 
baby be harmed or even distorted?
Such a metaphysical imagination is more reasonable before the clear 
split between subjective and objective experience, brought about by 
modern philosophy and science (e.g., Descartes, Galileo, Kant, and so on). 
Without a clear boundary between subjective and objective experience, 
a fantastical experience of supernatural creatures could be easily read as 
a supersensory encounter or discovery of reality, albeit weird and rare 
(e.g., spiritual intuitions of the divine realm). Our tendency is to read 
such an experience as strictly subjective and psychological, but that is a 
recent tendency. If an inner mash- up of forms and feelings could be an 
encounter with the real, then it’s a small step for some to believe that such 
mash-ups also cause real physical changes in the world (either by some 
action at a distance or some subtle matter mechanism). And it was not just 
mystics who entertained this possibility.
As recently as Darwin’s day, scientists debated this very question. An 
1865 letter to Darwin begins, “I have today come across a very remark-
able case of animal monstrosity with the particulars of which you will I 
think be interested.” George Maw, a Shropshire tile maker and amateur 
botanist, had sent the letter.7 Maw relates a recent pig birth at the local 
inn, in which a sow gave birth to ten normal piglets and one deformed 
creature resembling a little elephant. The monstrous offspring possessed a 
distinct trunk- like proboscis and the ears and mouth of an elephant. The 
creature was born alive but the mother smothered it, and the local phar-
macist pickled it in a jar of spirits.
Maw’s letter to Darwin asks advice. Does Mr. Darwin think it is inter-
esting enough for scientific analysis? Should Mr. Maw purchase the mon-
strosity and bring it to the Hunterian collection in the Royal College 
of Surgeons in London? Maw has investigated the case thoroughly and 
eagerly shares a tentative theory about the genesis of the elephant pig. A 
day or two after the sow was impregnated, he explains, a traveling menag-
erie passed through town and one of the elephants tried to attack the sow. 
She was terror-stricken by the experience, and Maw suggests that this 
trauma distorted the embryonic pig gestating within her. The frightening 
impression of the aggressive elephant traveled through the imagination of 
the sow and imprinted a disfiguration upon the forming matter in utero.
The theory of monstrous maternal impression was widespread from 
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the pre-Renaissance through the nineteenth century. It was often em-
ployed to account for organic distortions in human as well as animal em-
bryology. One is reminded of Joseph Merrick, “the Elephant Man,” who 
claimed that his own unfortunate condition was the result of his preg-
nant mother being frightened by a dangerous elephant in 1859. In his 
autobiographical pamphlet, Merrick says, “I first saw the light on the 5th 
of August, 1860, I was born in Lee Street, Wharf Street, Leicester. The 
deformity which I am now exhibiting was caused by my mother being 
frightened by an elephant; my mother was going along the street when a 
procession of animals were passing by, there was a terrible crush of people 
to see them, and unfortunately she was pushed under the elephant’s feet, 
which frightened her very much; this occurring during a time of preg-
nancy.”8 As superstitious and pernicious as this view of disability seems to 
us now, it was progress compared with the earlier theological view that 
abnormalities were punishments sent by God for sins of the parents.
Russian czar Peter the Great (1672–1725) celebrated all things mon-
strous and freakish in his early museum collections, and in some of his 
official proclamations he prohibited the killing of deformed children 
and requested that local officials send the “marvels” to his St. Petersburg 
museum. Obsessed with breeding giants and dwarfs, Peter looked more 
deeply into the science of teratology, the immediate mechanisms of de-
formation and variation. In one of his proclamations, he states:
Ignoramuses think that such monsters are born from the action of the devil, 
which is, however, impossible for there is only one creator of all creation, 
and that is God. And the Evil One has no power over any living creatures. 
For monsters are the result of internal damage, of fear and the thoughts of 
the mother during her pregnancy, of which fact there are many examples. 
For example, when the mother is frightened, hurt or injured in any way the 
child will be influenced.9
A hundred years before Peter’s psychologizing of monster embryol-
ogy, the French surgeon and scholar Ambroise Paré (1510–1590) also em-
phasized the role of the mother’s imagination in teratology. Paré started 
“rescuing” monsters from the melodramatic arena of spiritual and moral 
meaning, but failed to effect a complete revolution in monsterology and 
toggled between the highly superstitious and scientific. He certainly 
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paved the way for future medical scientists to study birth anomalies. 
Paré’s book On Monsters and Marvels took a relatively empirical approach 
to monsters, preferring the collection and dissection of oddities rather 
than simply hearsay natural history. Paré listed thirteen established causes 
of monster births, including naturalistic causes like too much or too little 
seed, but also supernatural causes like “God’s wrath.”10 Number five on 
his list was the imagination.
Paré describes a sad story of a girl whose body was “perfect and well- 
proportioned” save the fact that she had two heads. She lived for over 
twenty-five years, “which is not natural for monsters, who ordinarily live 
scarcely any length of time at all because they grow displeased and melan-
choly at seeing themselves so repugnant to everyone, so that their life is 
brief.” This rare moment of recognition—acknowledgment of the inner 
psychology and subjectivity of the monster—is abandoned quickly and 
the pariah status is underscored in the rest of Paré’s story. “This girl,” 
he continues, “went begging from door to door for her livelihood, and 
people gladly gave to her on account of the novelty of such a strange and 
such a new spectacle. Nevertheless, she was at last driven out of the Duchy 
of Bavaria because she could spoil the fruit of the pregnant women by the 
apprehension and ideas which might remain in their imaginative faculty, 
over the form of this so monstrous a creature. It is not good that monsters 
should live among us.”
Paré follows his ancient predecessors (i.e., Hippocrates, Aristotle, and 
Empedocles) in upholding a theory about the role of the mother’s imagi-
nation at the moment of conception and in early gestation. If a woman in 
coitus is exposed to some frightening, disturbing, or just strong imagery 
(either through the senses or memory), then her offspring may be im-
pressed upon by the offending image. Paré accepts the reality of a physio-
logical process—one that begins as a disturbing sense impression and ends 
with a distorted fetus. He offers a few cases to illustrate his point, some 
of which strain his own credulity while others seem quite credible to 
him. Undermining his own embryonic empiricism, he cites the authori-
ties of old. He tells of Queen Persina of Ethiopia, who together with 
the black King Hidustes mysteriously produced a white baby “because 
of the appearance of the beautiful Andromeda that she summoned up in 
her imagination, for she had a painting of her before her eyes during em-
braces from which she became pregnant.” Likewise we are told of another 
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girl who was born as furry as a bear. Her unfortunate state was a result of 
her mother “having looked too intensely at the image of Saint John [the 
Baptist] dressed in skins, along with his [own] body hair and beard, which 
picture was attached to the foot of her bed while she was conceiving.”
A more contemporary example is offered in Paré’s story of a baby born 
in 1517 France with the face of a frog. When asked what the cause of this 
monster might be, the father of the child explained that his wife had been 
ill with a fever and had taken the curative advice of her friend. The friend 
offered a folk cure, saying that the wife should carry around a frog in her 
hand until the frog died—at which point she would be cured of the fever. 
“That night she went to bed with her husband, still having said frog in her 
hand; her husband and she embraced and she conceived; and by the power 
of her imagination, this monster had thus been produced.”
From these cases, Paré, the medical man, offers some advice. It is im-
portant, he says, that women “should not be forced to look at or imag-
ine monstrous things” at the time of conception or during the early for-
mation of the child. But once the formation of the child is complete, no 
images or imaginings will have a detrimental effect upon the offspring.
Paré is drawing upon an ancient tradition that started in Aristotle’s Gen-
eration of Animals and found full force in the writings of Albertus Magnus 
(c. 1193–1280).11 This tradition explains conception and development as 
the impression of male “substantial form” (contained in semen) onto the 
menstrual blood or matter (contributed by the mother). This is in keep-
ing with Aristotelian and later Scholastic metaphysics of hylomorphism. 
Forms become instantiated in matter, and this makes one animal different 
from another (our species definitions are meant to capture these different 
substantial forms). But the mind itself is, according to Aristotle, the “form 
of forms.” The mind receives the forms of the natural world, not the mat-
ter (there’s no room in my mind for the material world). My mind takes 
in a form of a tree (and manipulates it as a representation), not the tree 
itself. The imagination is the receiver and manipulator of these forms, and 
it must be pliant enough to receive the impression, but durable enough to 
hold the forms. From Aristotle to Albertus Magnus, it was thought that 
the imagination of women was more susceptible to unhealthy impression 
because the female mind was more moist. Excessive moisture made the 
imaginative faculty easily corrupted with frightening external images and 
inner ideations. This impressionability put the fetus at risk of malforma-
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tion. Inner humidity “explained” certain kinds of monstrosity, but also 
the fickleness of females, who get impressed easily but lose focus because 
the mental substrate cannot hold the information properly.
These sorts of causal explanations may seem ridiculous to us, but they 
represent a naturalistic turn in the sense that they opened up possible 
research avenues. There may not have been a discoverable physiologi-
cal mechanism that transmits disturbing sense impressions to the concep-
tus, but at least Paré didn’t just throw up his hands and say “the devil 
did it.” Invoking the imagination also indicates some sense of psycho-
logical effects; psychology can lead to very concrete manifestations (e.g., 
a deeply troubled woman can result in a miscarriage). In this respect, 
Paré seems to foreshadow psychosomatic theories that flourished during 
Freud’s generation and beyond.
French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715) continued the 
exploration into metaphysical imagination, trying to bridge the dualism 
divide of mind and matter. The bond between mother and unborn child 
is the strongest that exists for humans:
And although their soul be separated from their mother’s, their body is not at 
all detached from hers, and we should therefore conclude that they have the 
same sensations and passions, i.e., that exactly the same thoughts are excited 
in their souls upon the occasion of the motions produced in her body. Thus, 
children see what their mothers see, hear the same cries, receive the same im-
pressions from objects, and are aroused by the same passions.12
Malebranche illustrates the point with a recent specimen that “all of Paris 
has been able to see as well as me, since it was preserved for a considerable 
time in alcohol.” A woman had been looking too intensely at a portrait 
of St. Pius and gave birth to a baby that resembled perfectly the face of 
the saint. The baby had the face of an old man, and even his forehead was 
shrunken due to the foreshortened angle of the portrait.
When a mother desires a pear too much, according to Malebranche, 
the pear shape (object of desire) will actually re- form in the extremely 
soft flesh of the embryo—distorting the body. The mother is spared this 
transformation because her body is no longer as soft and impressionable. 
Women are more impressionable than men, but less than babies.13
From Aristotle, through Ambroise Paré, to Peter the Great, the imagi-
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nation played an important role in the naturalized tradition of pathologi-
cal ontogenesis. Things began to change, however, in the first few decades 
of the nineteenth century. But breaking with such historical inertia was 
difficult. Mary Shelley’s friend Professor William Lawrence (1783–1867) 
was an early scientific martyr in the demystification of pathology, espe-
cially the metaphysical imagination.
Shelley apparently added the moralizing anti-materialist tone to Frank-
enstein in later editions because she feared the same condemnation that 
her friend William Lawrence received. He had been suspended from the 
Royal College of Surgeons because of the radical materialism contained 
in his controversial book Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural His-
tory of Man (1819). Fearing that her own book might be withdrawn, Mary 
Shelley tempered her original 1818 edition.14
Lawrence, however, paid a great service to embryology and laid to 
rest many popular misconceptions about monsters. Regarding the theory 
that a mother’s imagination can corrupt the fetus, he asked: What sort of 
mechanical process could operate from the mother’s imagination down 
to the womb, where it would then have to destroy the normally devel-
oping head and reconstruct a new monkey head or frog head or what-
ever? Furthermore, he stated, we have extensive evidence that women 
can suffer serious disorders (e.g., diseases, amputations, etc.) with no ill 
effect on the fetus, so frights and imaginings seem far too weak for fetal 
reconstruction.15
When George Maw wrote his 1865 letter about the elephant- pig mon-
ster, Darwin’s response came quickly—and it provides us with insight into 
late nineteenth-century embryology and changing ideas about imagina-
tion. Darwin had toured the many monsters of the Hunterian collection 
in London, but he was convinced, after reading the Étienne Geoffroy 
and Isidore Geoffroy, that monsters were developmental glitches.16 They 
were not “messages” or signs from the beyond, nor were they preformed 
in the germ. Instead, they were caused by environment. This environ-
mental developmental view of monsters left open the question: Did the 
mother’s imagination absorb and translate some shock to the piglet (per-
haps via pangenesis), or did common mechanical causes distort the fetus 
because of environmental flux? The answer is in the rarity or regularity 
of such occurrences. In his response to George Maw, Darwin doesn’t rule 
out the imagination thesis entirely, but he refers to Isidore Geoffroy’s 
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work. Darwin writes, “The monstrosity of a proboscis-like prolongation 
of the snout occurs much more frequently as stated by Isidore Geoffroy 
than with any other animal; and therefore I presume is not rare.” A pig 
trunk is, in fact, a common aberration and correlates with developmen-
tal patterns of craniofacial formation. Similar developmental glitches can 
be seen when the forward- most part of the brain (prosencephalon) fails 
to properly divide the eye orbits into two cavities and Cyclops anoma-
lies occur. The pig trunk is a common teratology defect. Darwin says that 
he “must believe that the coincidence of the visit of the elephant and the 
birth of the monster was a simple accident.”
Increasingly, monsters came to be seen as the result of pliable de-
velopmental causes, but the pliability was not like the radical folk version 
of maternal imagination. It wasn’t the lack of an imagination- sculpting 
mechanism that doomed the theory of metaphysical imagination. After all, 
the nineteenth century lacked knowledge of other crucial mechanisms 
too, such as the mammalian egg and the genetic DNA unit of heredity, 
but science still held out for both. The metaphysical imagination just 
slowly died in scientific culture from a lack of significant correlations be-
tween mothers’ imaginations and teratology cases. The connection was 
too anecdotal.
Setting scientific culture aside, however, folk belief in “imagination 
distortion” remains alive and well. When my Chinese wife was pregnant 
with our son, I was regularly told (by my in- laws and other Chinese rela-
tives) that I should keep my wife calm and away from disturbing imagery. 
This advice was offered by highly educated urban professional Chinese, 
not uneducated rural villagers.17
In southern India, pregnant women are cautioned against looking 
upon temple decorations of lion figures or disturbing deities. “If she 
does,” ethnographer Edgar Thurston says, “the tradition is that she will 
give birth to a monster.” Thurston writes, “Some Hindus in Madras be-
lieve that it would be unlucky for a newly-married couple to visit the 
museum, as their offspring would be deformed as the result of the mother 
having gazed on the skeletons and stuffed animals.”18
More recently, the Ethnicity and Disability Fact Book, updated regu-
larly by the Multicultural Disability Advocacy Association of New South 
Wales, reminds us that many people around the world still believe that 
disabilities can be “caught” like a contagion by encountering other dis-
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abled people or frightening events. “The idea that disabilities can be 
caught is quite common across the world. This results mostly in actions 
to protect pregnant women from seeing, hearing or touching people with 
disability or even their technical aids.” In addition, disabilities are fre-
quently blamed on “perception negligence” of the mother. “In the Philip-
pines,” the Fact Book explains, “a woman gave birth to a baby who was un-
able to move his limbs. Her explanation of her son’s disability was that she 
had worked in view of a statue of a national hero during her pregnancy 
and must have caught the ‘stiffness of the limbs.’<”19 In Ghana, women 
must not look at blood or monkeys or disturbing carvings. In Jamaica, 
mothers are advised against seeing a human or animal corpse. The same 
is advised by North American Indians, and Nigerian mothers are told to 
make sure that no ugly people walk behind them. Sami mothers in Lap-
land are to avoid conversations about deformity and avoid witnessing 
reindeer calving.20
All this superstition is easy to dismiss, and we’re tempted to write off 
the maternal impression thesis as retrograde magical thinking. But as 
usual, these folkways contain deeper truths. We will not, I suspect, find 
any mechanism that translates bad thoughts or disturbing perceptions 
into monstrous babies, but we now accept the more general mechanisms 
by which maternal stress negatively impacts offspring.
Stressed mothers release high levels of cortisol and adrenaline into 
their systems. Ordinarily these hormones are useful for fight- or- flight 
adaptive responses to threats, but if their levels stay too high for too 
long, they can damage the mother’s body and brain, and compromise the 
health of the child. Acute stress (like seeing something very disturbing) 
or chronic stress (like living in an unsafe environment) can bring un-
healthy hormone levels into the baby’s system. These changes can alter 
brain development and corrupt blood flow in the fetus, reducing oxy-
gen levels and negatively impacting organ integrity. Moreover, a stressed 
mother tends to eat and sleep poorly, and these are not optimal for the 
baby’s health.
Perhaps a little superstition about maternal imagination and monsters 
helped generations of mothers and babies stay healthier. As we enter a 
new kind of epigenetic paradigm, we may have even more reason to cele-
brate the paranoid preventions of prenatal monsterology. “Epigenetic” 
formerly meant embryological development from simple to complex 
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structure (as opposed to preformation), but the term has a new mean-
ing these days. “Epigenetic” has been resurrected by biologists recently 
to refer to the newly discovered layer of molecular triggers and switches 
that ride on top of our genetic code.
The new epigenetics is rendering the old distinction between nature 
and nurture obsolete. It is also revealing how the mother’s prenatal uter-
ine environment can “communicate” features of the outside world to the 
baby’s epigenome (switching system) and set new default traits that may 
last for multiple generations. For example, recent data from the “Dutch 
Hunger Winter” show an epigenetic switch for obesity. Nazis in 1944 
Holland diverted food from the Netherlands to Germany. Longitudinal 
studies of the Dutch population have demonstrated that if a fetus was 
in its second or third trimester during this famine, the fetus “learned” 
that the environment was extremely poor in nutritional resources, so the 
brain/body adapted in utero by calibrating its physiology to aggressive 
conservation of incoming fat, sugar, and nutrition generally. The fetuses 
that were developing in this hostile uterine environment of the Dutch 
Hunger Winter automatically reprogrammed to store every bit of in-
coming calories. The result, many years later, was a high degree of obe-
sity in the adults who were epigenetically changed during their fetal ex-
periences. Lab testing on rodents has isolated the actual epigenetic switch 
for fat storage that can be turned on or off.21 The point of this, for our 
purposes, is that maternal experience can have shaping influences (be-
yond genetics) on the gestating offspring—both short- and long-term 
influences. The developing fetus is unrolling a genetic program, but it is 
also a very plastic and impressionable system—open to real- time changes 
in the mother’s experience.
None of this is meant to suggest that maternal imagination can distort 
embryos and fetuses in the traditional metaphysical manner. Science has 
not confirmed earlier magical thinking, and it probably won’t. But it’s 
interesting that we’re more culturally sensitive than ever to the impor-
tance of “womb safety”—not only avoiding disturbances but also play-
ing Mozart and Bach to the gravid belly. We’re reminded that chemistry 
emerged slowly out of alchemy, and evolution theory arose out of natu-
ral theology. Theories of maternal imagination reveal a complex dialogue 
between folk psychology, teratology, and medical embryology.22
These days, we’re not metaphysical about the imagination. Or at least 
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we lengthen the causal chain between antecedent imaginings and physical 
changes in the world. We no longer think the imagination sculpts differ-
ent kinds of bodies, but from Freud through to the present, we do think 
psychological images have long-range impact on the well-being of the 
imaginer and his community.
Culture has always used the imagination as a tool for social cohe-
sion and ethical norm enforcement—take another look, for example, at 
Christian paintings of hell. But consider that we are now living in a cul-
ture where some of the most sadistic torture movies can be downloaded 
by anyone with an Internet connection. With a very modest cable tele-
vision package, for example, I recently watched (to my great regret) a 
handful of Hollywood films involving a zombie pushing a needle into a 
victim’s eye (slowly), followed by a relentless gang rape scene, topped off 
with a revenge sequence in which a man is tied to a tree with his eyelids 
hooked open by fishing tackle and crows pluck out his eyes. Am I psycho-
logically improved by such images or diminished by them?
The director of the splatter film Hostel, Eli Roth, has defended his 
sadistic films on what appear to be Freudian grounds. Interviewed fre-
quently in the media, Roth argued that horror films tend to crop up more 
when the country is undergoing severe social stresses: the Vietnam era 
produced the original Texas Chain Saw Massacre, Last House on the Left, and 
others, while the post- 9/11 and Iraq War era also corresponds with an in-
flux of violent horror films. Political correlations aside, Roth argues that 
human fear and anxiety are held in check during our day- to- day func-
tioning, but sometimes we need to exorcise these troubling emotions. 
Horror films allow us the opportunity to scream and release anxiety in a 
cathartic manner.23 Horror films, according to Roth, have a therapeutic 
effect. “There are soldiers in Iraq,” Roth explains, “that write me and tell 
me that Hostel is one of the most popular movies in the military.”
They love it. I wrote back and asked, “Why on earth would you watch Hos-
tel after what you see in a day?” And he wrote back and said that he was out 
during the day with his friends and they saw somebody’s face get blown off, 
and then they watched the movie that night with about 400 people and they 
were all screaming. But when they’re on the battlefield, you have to be a ma-
chine. You can’t react emotionally. You have to tactically respond to a situa-
tion. And these guys are going out every day seeing this horrible stuff, and 
Uncorrected Proofs For Review Only
1062-1.0.indd   38 1/6/2017   1:23:22 PM
T H E  S E C O N D  U N I V E R S E : 3 9
they’re not allowed to be scared. But it all gets stored up, and it’s got to come 
out. And when they watch Hostel, it’s basically saying, for the next 90 min-
utes, not only are you allowed to be scared, you’re encouraged to be scared 
because it’s okay to be terrified.24
Roth does not explicitly intone Freud in his explanation, but that is 
only because the theory of the repressed and released Id has now attained 
the paradigm status of common sense. But if torture porn encourages 
a purging of anxieties, it certainly adds new previously unimaginable 
images of vulnerability to the audience’s experience. It remains to be seen 
whether or not the fears and anxieties that torture porn takes out of view-
ers by catharsis is superseded by the new fears it puts in.25 Some critics of 
sadistic imagination, including the creator of Buffy the Vampire Slayer, Joss 
Whedon, have claimed that torture porn debases its audience—taking 
away something from the people who have seen it.26 We’ll come back to 
the wider social and psychological implications in the last chapter of this 
book, but for now we need to introduce some of the cognitive architec-
ture that underlies the stories we consume.
A  S E C O N D  U N I V E R S E
Salvador Dalí met Sigmund Freud only once, in 1938, but the patriarch of 
the unconscious had already been shaping the artist’s dreams and paintings 
for decades. Dalí showed Freud his Metamorphosis of Narcissus—a night-
mare of twisting and melting human flesh and musical instruments—as 
a demonstration of his devotion to Freud. Years before, in fact, Dalí—
inspired by Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams—experimented by placing his 
unfinished paintings at the foot of his bed, so that he might take the 
imagery into the dream world. He would then “work” upon the imagery 
while asleep and return from reverie with useful souvenirs and solutions. 
Dalí was so dedicated to exploring the fertile liminal space between con-
sciousness and unconsciousness that he frequently took naps while hold-
ing a spoon over a metal mixing bowl, so he’d repeatedly startle awake to 
the clang of his drowsy spoon drop.
For many of us, surrealism is a paradigm example of what we mean 
by imagination. Who shows us better the meaning of imagination than 
the weirdest, eccentric artists? But we’re actually misled about the na-
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ture of imagination if our paradigm cases are artists. Scientists, too, are 
highly adept with the mysterious imaginative faculty, employing it in 
many theoretical breakthroughs. Charles Darwin, for example, could not 
formulate the precise mechanism of evolution until he chanced to read 
an unrelated economics essay by Thomas Malthus. Human population 
growth, according to Malthus, is checked by resource limits—adapting 
population numbers (by famine and disease) to the changing contours 
of available food, land, and so on. Chance favors the prepared mind, as 
Louis Pasteur noticed, and Darwin suddenly imagined Malthus’s eco-
nomics principle applied to all of Nature herself. In this imaginative leap, 
the principle of natural selection was born. This appears to be an example 
of hybridizing frames, which was discussed above in the list of improvisa-
tional techniques.
Crossing from one domain to another is a crucial feature of imagina-
tive thinking. Einstein claimed that his mind engaged in a kind of “com-
binatory play” or “associative play” just before his breakthroughs. His 
logical analysis would follow after this synthesizing creative phase. Many 
mathematicians and scientists get their “aha moments” after they have re-
laxed their conscious pursuit of a solution. When the problem sinks down 
into the unconscious, it continues to have a life, as it were—a private life 
that consciousness is not privy too. Then, while she’s brushing her teeth 
or crossing the street, the scientist suddenly sees her solution. Einstein 
famously said, “I am enough of an artist to draw freely upon my imagi-
nation. Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is 
limited. Imagination encircles the world.”27
A hagiography of imaginative artists and scientists will not reveal the 
most important and ignored aspect of our creative faculty—namely, its 
centrality to our mundane as well as our magical thinking. Philosophers 
call this ability to think of something that doesn’t exist “counterfac-
tual” thinking. And the vast majority of our thinking is of this non-real, 
counterfactual variety. When you lie in bed playing a revisionist version 
of the argument you had with your boss—a version where you make 
some genius and vindicating retort—you’re engaging in counterfactual 
thinking. When you project a series of possible outcomes before you go 
on a date or eat a cake or buy a house, you’re engaging in counterfactual 
thinking. As Harvard psychiatrist Arnold H. Modell puts it, our minds 
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have the ability to create “a second universe”—an internal environment 
of possibilities that exists concurrently with the stubborn physical world.
Do other animals have this second universe? Do some children fail 
to develop imagination? Did early humans have it? These deep ques-
tions put the imagination at the center of the human mystery. But sur-
prisingly there is very little philosophical writing or scientific research 
on the imagination, and what little that does exist treats imagination as 
peripheral (a sub- branch of aesthetics). Contrary to our negligent tradi-
tion, the improvising imagination should probably be the paradigm of 
human thinking.
Cognitive science has made great strides in the realm of computa-
tional information processing, but that stuff is not thinking. Computer 
programs simulate thought by channeling input data through logical syn-
tax systems to arrive at outputs. This approach to cognition—artificial 
intelligence—produces great chess-playing and Jeopardy!-winning com-
puters, but it doesn’t help us understand the more image-based and em-
bodied thinking of human beings. The imagination is more associational 
than computational—it links together ideas and images instead of deriv-
ing or inferring them. And yet the imagination is not a passive spectator 
of images and memories, for it also actively constructs new knowledge 
and new behavioral options. The representations in the mind’s eye are not 
just information data, like neutral photos, but have a fundamental emo-
tional or affective component—at the very least, a representation comes 
painted with an “approach” or “avoid” feeling (positive or negative affect). 
We use the representations of the second universe (the virtual world) to 
rehearse for, predict, and re- create the first universe (the actual natural 
world).
Archaeologist Steven Mithen argues that our ancestors lacked some 
of our powers of imagination. The cave paintings and Venus sculptures 
of the Upper Paleolithic (50,000–10,000 years ago) are often taken as evi-
dence of artistic imagination—a sparking period for the cultural confla-
gration to come. But Mithen points out that even the simple hand ax—
which was flaked repeatedly to a biface symmetrical point—required our 
earlier ancestors Homo erectus to imagine an ideal form at the end of the 
knapping process. Some kind of counterfactual image—a remembered 
ax or a mental ideal, or something, must have guided the real-time pro-
cess. But while this early case of an emerging second universe (inside the 
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Homo head) is interesting, archaeology suggests that their imaginations 
were rudimentary. Once fixed upon, hand- ax industry stayed basically the 
same for over a million years and did not evolve into other adaptive tools 
like spear points, arrowheads, and stone knives. Mithen suggests that pre- 
sapiens humans lacked the more sophisticated imagination to innovate 
these useful new tools.28 The imagination comes online slowly, in fits and 
starts, over the course of human evolution.
In fact, we might be engaging in some unjustified anthropomorphism 
(or sapiens- morphism) when we think of Homo erectus flint knapping his 
way toward some mental ideal (even remembered prototype). Our mod-
ern brains might fix an ideal image in our mind’s eye and then chip our 
stone tool toward that teleological end, but this presupposes a very sophis-
ticated second universe. Our ancestors more likely carried real prototype 
hand axes with them and knapped new stones to resemble the physical 
forms in front of their eyes and in their hands. The physical prototypes 
themselves may have slowly emerged, carried down through generations, 
after earlier discovery of useful, naturally occurring bi- face stones. The 
art of stone tool creation was probably governed more by physical copy-
ing or mimicry, rather than by mental representation or ideational design.
1.2.#The Venus of Willendorf is a four- inch statuette,  
believed to be carved between 28,000–25,000 BCE. 
Similar Upper Paleolithic statuettes have been discov-
ered all over Europe.
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Our own second universe is very good at representing things that 
we’ve seen before. Homo sapiens remembered experiences and then re-
played them and re-created them with increasing executive cognitive 
control and purpose. Something dramatic happens when we move be-
yond a remembered image to an embellished image. The famous fertility 
carving Venus of Willendorf (25,000–28,000 BCE), for example, has an 
unlikely obese body type for the time of its creation—more a work of the 
second universe, perhaps, than an accurate memory or perception. Pre-
sumably the artist employed imagination to expand the hips and breasts 
of the endomorphic bodies that he/she encountered in the real world. 
That kind of extrapolation and embellishment is more miraculous than 
it at first seems.
It’s “miraculous” because it means that our head space can take in copies 
or representations of the outside world and then manipulate them inside 
the mind. Obviously, we can fit a representation of a hippo in our head, 
but not the hippo. We take in shape, color, sound, and so on, through per-
ceptual equipment, but how does this get instantly stitched together into 
a coherent hippo (in real time), and how does it become a symbol (after 
the perception) for later cognitive manipulation? The Epicurean philoso-
phers of ancient Greece were so mystified by mental representations, they 
formulated a charming theory that physical objects are always giving off 
atomic tissues or films of themselves—like the shedding of ghostly in-
visible skins—and these atomic films enter into our eyes and travel into 
the mental space. Happily, we understand perception much better these 
days, but our understanding of how representations form (bind together 
sense data), get stored, get re- accessed, and get played with is not much 
better than the quaint Epicurean view. Neuroscientist John R. Smythies 
poses the relevant question, “How do the brain mechanisms actually con-
struct the phenomenal object?”29 Neuroscience will certainly help us, 
over the next few decades, grasp some of the mechanics of our counter-
factual second universe, but we’re just beginning the investigation.
In the philosophical tradition, the term “representation” has a broad 
sense. It is an inner mental entity that has meaning via its correspondence 
with the external world or via its coherence within a context of other 
meaningful experiences (i.e., other representations, rules, schema, emo-
tions, and so on). My representation of a “dog” stands in for real flesh-
and-blood mammals out in the world. The mental method for acquiring 
such an inner “dog” is still much- disputed territory (from naïve realism 
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that sees the mind as a mirror of nature to social constructivism that sees 
culture as the creator of our inner conceptual categories, to all points in 
between). My own views about representations (What are they, and how 
do we get them?) will emerge naturally from the coming chapters, but 
it is enough now to acknowledge that our second universe is populated 
with thoughts, beliefs, concepts, images, and so on that have some level 
of intentionality. My inner image of a dog intends, refers to, or is “about” 
some four- legged creature out in the world. But even my imaginative 
improvisations—Cerberus the three- headed dog or Scooby- Doo—have 
some intentionality too, in the sense that they refer to mental realities, 
possibilities, and traditions (housed both in the individual mind and the 
reservoir of culture).
Our inner play of representations is remarkable partly because we have 
significant control over the process, and our distant ancestors probably 
didn’t. I can consider a hippo in my mind’s eye by calling up a memory 
from past experience, but I can also imagine it purple or ten times its 
natural size, or even dress it in a tutu and dance it through my Disney-
esque mind space. That means that I have a lot of agency in the second 
universe—in fact, I have almost God- like control there. But before we 
1.3.#An imaginary hippo in a tutu. Inspired by the 
1940 Disney animation film Fantasia.
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evolved the ability to control the second universe, it probably had a rich 
life of its own and controlled us every night when we entered dream 
sleep. We’ll return to dreams in a subsequent chapter, but for now we 
must acknowledge the central problem of doing “archaeology” of the 
human mind.
The current operating system of our minds is a bias generator, as we 
try to penetrate the ancestral mind (which had a different operating sys-
tem). If I try, for example, to imagine what it was like to be a conscious 
being before language (either a Homo erectus man or a contemporary Homo 
sapiens baby), I run straight into the fact that my mind is already deeply 
structured by language. It is difficult to peek around the veil of language 
to see the prelinguistic operating system at work. Likewise, if I go out and 
try to flint knap a stone ax, I’ll try to remember images I’ve seen, try to 
hold them in my mind’s eye (even rotating and manipulating them), and 
work the stone toward that end. But this requires symbolic token/type 
thinking, sequential mental grammar, and executive intellectual man-
agement that almost certainly preclude our ancestors from flint knapping 
with the same methodology. Just as animal ethologists must avoid the 
tendency to project human rationality onto animals, we must be careful 
not to pro ject contemporary forms of creativity (highly intellectual and 
culturally sophisticated) onto our earlier ancestors.
My goal in this section has been to acknowledge the rich second uni-
verse of representations that we enjoy and to admit their importance 
for contemporary imaginative improvisation. It’s a reasonable place to 
start our investigation because we are more phenomenologically aware 
of our representations (more aware, anyway, than we are of the mind/
brain mechanisms that produce them). But now we need to bracket out 
this rich conceptual inner world (for a few chapters at least) and try to 
dig underneath it to find its evolutionary predecessors. So, we will come 
at the improvising mind obliquely for a few chapters, before returning 
to the more recognizable cultural manifestations of human imagination.
P H I L O S O P H I C A L  M I S S T E P S
I recognize that philosophers isolated some extremely important as-
pects of the imagination, but they also turned us in the wrong direction. 
Aristotle, in his De Anima, suggested that the imagination ( phantasia) is 
a middle faculty between our sense perceptions (colors, sounds, tastes, 
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etc.) and our mind (the realm of concepts and judgments). Like sight, the 
imagined form has sensual properties and shares in some aspects of our 
embodiment. The imagination—which Aristotle says is “that in virtue of 
which an image occurs in us”—provides us pictures that have particular 
shapes, sizes, colors, and so on.30 But sense impressions are never really 
false, according to Aristotle. They are like raw data. When the drunk 
person perceives the walls moving, he truly perceives the walls mov-
ing. Imagination, however, joins perceptions to additional mental data 
and sometimes forms judgments. In this way it is more like mind (nous), 
which abstracts out particular sensual data and considers the universal de-
fining features of a thing. Mind is a “form of forms”—able to ignore the 
material aspects of natural things and re cord and process their formal as-
pects. Mind can run code versions of experience.
Although there are many differences between Aristotle’s and Im-
manuel Kant’s philosophies, Kant seems to agree that the imagination is 
an unconscious synthesizing faculty that pulls together sense perceptions 
and binds them into coherent representations that have universal con-
ceptual dimensions.31 I see this fluffy brown shape moving in the field 
and quickly judge it to be a rabbit—a creature that fits into a formal 
conceptual category (of the family Leporidae, inside another category 
Mammalia, inside the subphylum Vertebrata, etc., or the folk-taxonomy 
equivalents). The imagination (an inscrutable black box) plays some role 
in subsuming particulars (percepts) under universals (concepts).
According to philosophers, our image- making faculty helps package 
our experience into manageable units that can be plugged into cognitive 
judgment faculties. These cognitive judgments are propositional, in the 
sense that they have subject/predicate attribution structure (“the rabbit is 
brown”) and the judgments are categorial (“this brown creature is a mam-
mal”). But a little reflection will reveal the strangeness of this model. It 
is extremely rare to see a moving shape in a field and suddenly turn into 
Linnaeus, cataloging and classifying my experience into a cognitive sys-
tem. We rarely engage with the world by explicitly categorizing it, using 
essentialist definitions. In rarefied endeavors, like science, we try to re-
late our experiences to abstract models and form judgments and predic-
tions accordingly, but most of our imaginative work is well below that 
erudite level.
Philosophers have “jumped the gun” and raced straight from percep-
tion to propositional conceptualization, missing the huge middle ground. 
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I recognize the rabbit more by automatically associating it with memory 
images, not subsuming the percepts under a formal abstract concept. I 
associate this brown creature to a prototype memory—a learned and 
stored master image of a rabbit—and this helps put the experience into 
an overall context of meaning. And I manage to judge the experience in 
many ways that are not like logical inferences. As soon as I recognize the 
rabbit, for example, I am affectively or emotionally drawn (“Oh, isn’t he 
cute?” Or in the case of the killer rabbit in Monty Python and the Holy Grail, 
“Isn’t he frightening!”). These positive and negative affective judgments 
are very tightly conjoined with our perceptions and slip into the psycho-
logical mix well ahead of the conceptual processing.
The missing middle ground, which philosophers have ignored, is the 
truly interesting territory for us because it is the realm of evolutionary 
degrees. Before you have a modern eye, you need a simpler optical prede-
cessor, and before that you need a responsive light-sensitive tissue. Evo-
lution scales up from the ground, so to speak. Evolution built a crude 
imaginative faculty before it refined it into a sophisticated one. The crude 
system (dominated by affects and perceptions) is still alive and well in the 
basement of our psychology. In the two chapters ahead, I will explore 
some of these underappreciated forms of imaginative and adaptive im-
provisation, namely: thinking with your body, and thinking with images.
Y O U  A R E  A N  E X P E R T I M P R O V I S E R
When I was in my twenties, I had the good fortune to play guitar as an 
opening act for blues legend B.B. King. This lucky break opened many 
doors for me, and I soon found myself playing with other legends like 
Otis Rush, Buddy Guy, and Bo Diddley. Whenever Bo Diddley came 
through Chicago, I was repeatedly hired to play guitar for him. These 
were hair-raising gigs, because we never talked or rehearsed beforehand, 
and I never knew what was coming until he walked onstage during the 
actual performance. The first time he hired me, I spent hours the week 
before the gig rehearsing and reacquainting myself with Bo’s many hits. 
He arrived to the venue five minutes before showtime. When I first met 
him, as he walked onstage in front of five hundred shouting fans, I tried 
to tell him all the songs I had prepared. He just looked at me blankly—
through his coke- bottle glasses—plugged in his guitar, and launched into 
a loud rhythmic riff on his trademark square guitar. He never bothered 
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to tell me what song we were playing, what chord changes were coming, 
what key we were in, or anything. But, as every blues and jazz musician 
knows, that’s how it goes.
I was getting my improvisational education from some of the masters. 
But the apprenticeship was stressful. Bo Diddley, Buddy Guy, and all the 
great blues bandleaders never told me what was coming next, because 
they didn’t know themselves. My job was to fumble and find the chord 
we were playing, which usually told me the key signature. Sometimes I 
could assume a certain chord progression and scale, but not always. Then 
I had to watch the bandleader like a hawk, for subtle cues of musical di-
rection—this tilt of the guitar means I should solo, this slight bend of 
the knees means bring the dynamic volume down, this sudden jerk of 
the upper body means break, or stop. Once, while playing with the great 
but volatile Otis Rush, the band missed the cue and played one beat too 
many. He stopped, walked slowly over to us, as the audience looked on 
intensely, and said between clenched teeth, “When I tell you to stop, you 
muthafuckin’ STOP!”
Improvising is simultaneously composing and performing, and doing 
it onstage in front of a large audience with an exacting and temperamen-
tal artist is high-stakes creativity. There may even be a touch of masoch-
ism in it. But it is certainly spontaneous, and the great innovators, like 
Buddy Guy, have found a way to maximize the jeopardy and exhilaration.
I played in the house band of Buddy Guy’s music club Legends 
throughout the 1990s. Together with a band called Howard and the White 
Boys, I toured the Midwest with Buddy, as he supported his album Damn 
Right, I’ve Got the Blues. This led to many improvisational moments, as 
Buddy regularly jumped onstage to surprise us while we played. He en-
joyed “cutting heads” (guitar dueling) with me, and we often engaged 
in spontaneous riff conversations, where he would play a two- or four-
measure melody and I would try to copy it, augment it, or even best it, 
if possible. He taught me how to take my time and wait for the music to 
“come to me” rather than forcing it with too much strident effort.
Buddy is such an improvisational musician that he often starts a song 
and after two verses feels moved to turn in a new direction, singing a 
completely different song for a couple verses, until the spirit moves him 
to switch again. This technique is maddening for the purist, because 
Buddy doesn’t finish what he started, but it’s also exciting and unique be-
cause no two performances are ever the same. Playing with such a genius 
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is a huge challenge, because songs change, key signatures change, tempos 
change at the drop of a hat, and everyone is at the immediate behest of 
the artist’s changing mood.
None of this imaginative improvisation works, however, unless the 
musicians share a language of musical tools and norms. And some of these 
tools (scales, chords, etc.) and norms (conventions of dynamics, breaks, 
progressions, etc.) are learned on the job, so to speak. They are acquired 
in the process of the communication itself. A more open and attentive 
listener acquires more innovative and nuanced moves, and increases her 
lexicon of expressive gestures. And of course some pre-learning and 
practice are also crucial for a successful and adaptive improvisational en-
counter.
Music aside, the deeply improvisational nature of most verbal con-
versations reveals the balance and need for shared tools, norms, and pro-
cesses. We can see some of the hidden tools and norms more clearly when 
we consider the imperfect rather than perfect case of conversation. Talk-
ing with a stranger in a tongue that is not your own, for example, is deeply 
humbling and imperfect, but also reveals the interplay of prepared tools 
and real- time apprentice learning. The process is more associational than 
algorithmic.
I have been learning to speak Mandarin for years, and foreign lan-
guages are not one of my natural aptitudes. As any second-language 
learner knows, before one can really converse with a native speaker, there 
are many levels of intermediate proto- conversation. You learn a language 
in part by first memorizing some stock phrases, and these become your 
go- to clichés. As soon as a real- world exchange goes off script, which is 
quickly, the beginner is lost. But the intermediate speaker can try to get 
things back on track with certain improvisational “bridges” that keep dia-
logue rolling.
Sometimes in China, I would get into a brief conversation, and the 
topic would tilt toward food. In the midst of my intermediate proto-
conversations, I would often fail to properly understand a question or 
comment, or I’d catch the tail end but not the full meaning. If I kept ask-
ing the person to repeat themselves, they would quickly give up and stop 
engaging in the conversation—in part because they could see we weren’t 
getting anywhere and also because they were embarrassed for me. An 
alternate move, however, was more adaptive.
While still confused by a specific statement, one can reply with a state-
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ment that is at least vaguely connected to the topic at hand—stating it as 
if you are answering their question or comment. In most of these cases, 
the other person nods and keeps going with you. You’ve added some-
thing in between an appropriate response and a non sequitur. It’s a kind 
of pseudo- sequitur. It is a bridging mechanism that gets you to the next 
bit of conversation that both parties understand.
“Do you like Chinese food?”
“Yes, I like it very much.”
“Do you enjoy dumplings?”
“No, I have not eaten yet today. I am very hungry.”
“I see. Do you like tea?”
“Yes, I like green tea very much.”
In music and everyday conversation we achieve startling speeds of im-
provisation, and the stakes can be dramatic. But a truly high- stakes form 
of improvisation can be found in medicine, where lives are actually hang-
ing in the balance. Medical improv is a new form of training, in which 
theater improv techniques are used to train doctors, nurses, and first- 
1.4. Any traveler who gets off the beaten path unwittingly engages his finest improvising 
skills, even in a gentle haggling session.
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responders to communicate and troubleshoot more effectively. Work-
shops are cropping up all around the country, and Northwestern Uni-
versity Feinberg School of Medicine is a forerunner in the movement. 
Professors Katie Watson and Belinda Fu, at Northwestern and Univer-
sity of Washington, respectively, organize training sessions for health care 
providers and clinicians. “Improvisational theater skills have a surprising 
and substantial overlap with skills required of clinicians,” according to 
Watson and Fu. “Improv is a genre of performance art grounded in prin-
ciples of spontaneity, adaptability, collaboration, and skilled listening.”32
We’re all familiar with the common improv exercise of “ask for”—
wherein the improviser asks for a suggested place or character persona or 
situation from audience members. But many other improv exercises re-
veal the larger social and cognitive structures of rapid problem solving. 
For example, an often- used exercise in improv is sometimes called “Ad-
vance and Expand.” In this exercise, a group of improvisers will be spon-
taneously creating a scene of one sort or another, and the instructor will 
shout out “advance,” requiring the players to focus their comments and 
gestures entirely on advancing the storyline of the scene. At another time, 
the instructor shouts out “expand” and the players must immediately ex-
plore the environment to find fresh resources or directions for the scene 
under construction. These discoveries can then be incorporated into ad-
vancing the storyline too. We will see in chapters 5 and 6 that cultural his-
tory and the mind itself toggle between these “advance and expand” ten-
dencies. There are highly associational stream-of-consciousness states and 
more consolidated and centralized-conscious states that work together in 
the improvisational imagination. But more on that later.
A medical team, especially in emergency situations, needs to assess 
problems quickly, determine curative options, and mine the immediate 
environment for useful resources. Improv training can be helpful for such 
dramatic troubleshooting, but it also helps doctors with notorious com-
munication challenges. When medical students in Northwestern’s medi-
cal improv course were asked to name some of the common complaints 
about doctors, they listed: “Doesn’t listen, arrogant, bad communication, 
makes you feel inferior, objectifying.”33 One of the cardinal rules of im-
prov training, however, is to respond to others with the modus operandi 
of “yes, and . . .” rather than “No.” When someone proposes an unfamil-
iar or strange idea, the improviser does not immediately shut it down 
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because it is unfamiliar or inconsistent with her assumptions, but rather 
explores the idea. Practicing this “yes, and . . .” communication style can 
help health care providers overcome some of the common complaints 
and also aid in proper diagnosis and treatment. “<‘Improv’ is not synony-
mous with ‘comedy,’<” explain Watson and Fu, “but the fundamental prin-
ciples of improv (spontaneity and honesty) can naturally lead to humor. 
That’s what makes medical improv ‘serious play’—the method is fun, but 
the goals are serious.”34
Like medicine, business schools have recently begun to incorporate 
improvisational training in their management and executive curriculum. 
Robert Kulhan has been improvising on stages for many years, and he also 
teaches improv skills at Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business, in 
North Carolina. “Improvisation,” Kulhan explains, “isn’t about comedy, 
it’s about reacting—being focused and present in the moment at a very 
high level.”35
Lakshmi Balachandra, at MIT Sloan School of Management, teaches 
Improvisational Leadership and also lectures for advanced negotiation 
students at Harvard Business School. Before working in venture capital 
and finance, Balachandra was an improvisational comic and found those 
skills to be crucial in her business career. Improvisation, according to 
Balachandra, helps people think on their feet and react very quickly to 
unexpected changes that are impossible to plan for. “It applies to leader-
ship and it applies to negotiation, where you never have control over 
what happens. Negotiation is a dynamic process—you have to be able to 
think on your feet and adapt,” Balachandra explains. In business training, 
the improvisational approach helps leaders suspend their judgment, in-
creasing the likelihood and effectiveness of creative brainstorming. This 
is the same modus operandi of “yes, and . . .”
Music, medicine, business, and everyday conversation are just a few 
of the diverse domains that reveal a common underlying cognitive struc-
ture. You, dear reader, should recognize yourself in some of these ac-
tivities. You may not be a jazz musician or a field surgeon, but you are 
an expert improviser in some domain—conversation, cooking, parallel 
parking, parenting, or small business management. In the coming chap-
ters, we will explore the underlying cognitive, emotional, and social 
structure of your improvisational expertise.
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